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Abstract 
There has been a large rise in the UK ratio of personal wealth to national income. 
Personal wealth has grown since the 1970s about twice as fast in real terms as national 
income. Has this rise in the wealth-income ratio led to a corresponding increase in the 
wealth being passed on from one generation to the next?  Are we returning to the 
levels of inheritance found in the 19th century?  In France, the research of Thomas 
Piketty has highlighted the return of inheritance. The aim of this paper is to construct 
comparable UK evidence on the extent of the transmission of wealth in the form of 
estates and, insofar as it is possible, gifts inter vivos. It takes a long-run view of 
inheritance, starting from 1896, when the modern Estate Duty was introduced and 
exploits the extensive estate data published over the years in the UK. Construction of 
a long-run time series for more than a century is challenging, and there are important 
limitations to the resulting estimates which are discussed extensively in the paper. The 
resulting time-series demonstrates the major importance of inheritance in the UK 
before the First World War, when the total transmitted wealth represented some 20 
per cent when expressed relative to net national income. In the inter-war period, the 
total was around 15 per cent, falling to some 10 per cent after the Second World War, 
and then falling further to below 5 per cent in the late 1970s. Since then, there has 
indeed been an upturn, although less marked than in France: a rise from 4.8 per cent in 
1977 to 8.2 per cent in 2006. This increase was more or less in line with the increase 
in personal wealth, and has to be interpreted in the light of the changing net worth of 
the corporate and public sectors of the economy. 
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1.  Introduction 
There has been a large rise in the ratio of personal wealth to national income. In the 
United Kingdom, at the end of the 1970s the ratio of personal net worth, excluding 
pension rights, to net national income was under 3; today it is over 5. Personal wealth 
grew over this period faster than national income at a rate of some 2 per cent per 
annum – about twice as fast in real terms. The rise in the wealth-income ratio is one 
reason that the rise in top income shares has not led to the same rise in top wealth 
shares: the denominator has been rising as well as the numerator. Between 1979 and 
2005, the share of the top 1 per cent in total income more than doubled, but the share 
of the top 1 per cent in total personal wealth rose by only 1 percentage point (Atkinson 
and Morelli, 2012). 
 
Has this rise in the wealth-income ratio led to a corresponding increase in the wealth 
being passed on from one generation to the next? To the extent that the same assets 
(such as houses and businesses) are owned, but there has been a rise in their relative 
price, we may expect inheritance to rise in line. On the other hand, the rise in the 
significance of personal wealth may result from increased life-cycle savings. The rise 
in the wealth-income ratio may just be a reflection of the fact that people are 
expecting to spend longer in retirement. The simplest life-cycle model, with the rate of 
growth equal to the rate of interest, suggests that the wealth-income ratio rises by 0.5 
for each extra year of expected retirement (Modigliani, 1986, page 301). In that case, 
no more may be passed on in inheritance. But if we allow for the existence of state 
and private pension schemes (the figures quoted above exclude pension wealth), then 
0.5 has to be scaled down by (approximately) a factor of (1 – replacement rate). 
Moreover, as shown by Piketty (2009, section 5), the rise in the ratio is less marked 
when the rate of interest exceeds the rate of growth. The sensitivity of the calculations 
regarding the wealth-income ratio does indeed suggest that we cannot rely solely on 
simulations and have to consider the empirical evidence. 
 
The focus of this paper is on the empirical importance of inheritance in the UK. Has 
the rise in the personal wealth-income ratio been accompanied by a rise in bequests? 
The immediate motivation comes from the pioneering study for France by Piketty 
(2011), which shows that inheritance has returned after a period of decline. In France, 
the annual wealth transmitted fell from some 20 to 25 per cent of national income 
between 1820 and 1910 to around 2.5 per cent in 1950, but has since risen to around 
15 per cent in 2010. In his paper, he comments that “unfortunately there does not 
seem to exist any other country with estate tax data that is as long term and as 
comprehensive as the French data (2011, page 1077). This paper takes up this 
challenge. As far as the UK is concerned, he is correct: the data are less adequate. The 
data employed here start only in 1896, and they are less complete with regard to gifts. 
But they can be used. Indeed, Karagiannaki has recently investigated the evolution of 
inheritance in the UK over the period 1984 to 2005, finding that in this period “the 
annual flow of inheritance increased markedly” (2011, page iii). In her work, she also 
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makes extensive use of survey evidence (see the summary in Karagiannaki and Hills, 
2013), which is not available for the long time period studied here. 
 
The aim of this paper is to construct UK evidence on the extent of the transmission of 
wealth in the form of estates and, insofar as it is possible, gifts inter vivos. It follows 
Piketty in taking a long-run view of inheritance, starting from 1896, when the modern 
Estate Duty was introduced by Harcourt in the 1894 Finance Act. Piketty (2009 and 
2011) uses two approaches to the measurement of inheritance. The first is a direct 
measure of the flows of bequests and gifts using the rich fiscal data in France; the 
second is an indirect measure built up from mortality and wealth ownership data (this 
method in effect inverts the standard estate multiplier method of estimating the wealth 
of the living – see Atkinson and Harrison, 1978). This paper is based on the first 
method, exploiting the extensive estate data published over the years in the UK. (The 
second approach is used in making certain corrections to the estate-based estimates.) 
The sources and methods are described in Section 3. Construction of a long-run time 
series for more than a century is indeed challenging, and it is important to understand 
the limitations of the resulting estimates. The findings are set out in Section 4. One of 
the aims of the research is to compare the findings with those of Piketty for France, 
and this is the subject of Section 5. The comparison is of interest both on account of 
the similarities of the two countries and on account of the differences, notably in the 
case of England and Wales the freedom of bequest, which differentiates these parts of 
Great Britain from France (and Scotland). As Josiah Wedgwood remarked, “few 
Englishmen realize how great is the difference between the European laws of 
succession and their own” (1929 (1939), page 91). 
 
Before embarking on the estimation of the extent of inherited wealth, I begin in 
Section 2 by seeking to set the UK rise in the wealth-income ratio within the context 
of changes in the housing market and in the net worth of other sectors of the UK 
economy. 
 
2.  Background: The recent rise in personal wealth  
The evolution of the ratio of personal wealth to net national income in the UK since 
1920 is shown in Figure A. This shows the increase that has taken place in the past 30 
years. If this rise in the wealth-income ratio were the result of purely demographic 
developments, then we should expect it to have happened gradually over the post-war 
period. Life expectancy at age 65 has increased steadily. The average effective age of 
retirement for men in the UK fell more between 1950 and 1980 than between 1980 
and 1995, whereas the wealth-income ratio fell from around 4 in 1950 to under 3 in 
1980.  
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The U-shaped pattern since 1950 must therefore reflect other factors. One obvious 
hypothesis is suggested by the timing of the turning point, which coincided with the 
election in 1979 of a Conservative Government led by Mrs. Thatcher. Policies 
changed in directions that impacted directly on household wealth, most evidently the 
commencement of privatization, which led to the sale of state owned assets, including 
shares in nationalized industries and state-owned housing (through the “Right to Buy” 
sale of council houses). I begin with housing, since one natural reaction to Figure A is 
to say that “it is all to do with rising house prices”. 
 
Owner-occupation in the UK increased rapidly over the post-war period: in England 
and Wales, from 31 per cent in 1951 to 58 per cent in 1981 (Holmans, 2000, Table 
14.12). Insofar as this was accompanied by a fall in private landlords, there was no 
change in the sector of ownership. Indeed, total personal ownership of houses fell 
from 82 per cent in 1951 to 69 per cent in 1981. There was an increase in state-owned 
housing. This was reversed following 1979 by the sale of council houses, which meant 
that the total personal ownership of houses rose to 77 per cent in 1991. This explains 
part of the U shape. The upswing was re-inforced by the relative rise in housing prices 
that took place in the later part of the period. In 1970 UK house prices were no higher 
relative to consumer prices than in 1948, but between 1970 and 2009 house prices 
doubled in real terms.  
 
There were therefore two forces at work over the post-war period: a fall and then a 
rise in the proportion of the housing stock owned by persons, and a rise in relative 
house prices in the second part of the period. Both of these factors combined to raise 
the personal wealth-national income ratio in the later part of the period. As may be 
seen from Figure B, housing net wealth (taken from the national balance sheets, 
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Figure A  Personal wealth in the United Kingdom 1920-2010
Personal wealth as ratio to 
net national income
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subtracting the mortgage and other housing-related debt) made a sizeable contribution. 
It accounted for a third of the overall rise in the personal wealth-income ratio. As has 
been emphasized by Karagiannaki (2011a), the change in personal wealth between 
1995 and 2005 was almost entirely due to housing. But, over the longer run, housing 
is not the whole story as far as the personal sector is concerned. Comparing the two 
graphs, drawn with the same vertical scale, it may be seen that housing accounts for 
about half of the increase since the 1970s. 
 
 
 
In seeking to understand the other factors in operation affecting personal wealth, it is 
instructive to look at total national wealth, again expressed as a ratio to net national 
income – see Figure C. The ratio rose in the first part of the period but then stabilized. 
From 1957 to 1979 the ratio went from under 4 to over 6. But in 2010 it was at much 
the same level as in 1979. If housing is deducted, then the ratio fell steadily from 
1979. The recent rise in the personal wealth-income ratio must therefore have come at 
the expense of falling net worth of other sectors. In the same way, the rise in national 
wealth before 1979 must have been associated with a rise in the net worth of other 
sectors, since the personal wealth-income ratio was falling.   
 
Figure D shows the net worth position of the corporate and public sectors. The 
corporate sector includes private non-financial corporations and financial 
corporations. In his study, The wealth of the nation, Revell (1967) drew attention to 
the fact that the value of company shares on the stock market fell considerably short – 
at that time – of the value placed on the company assets, net of liabilities. Treating the 
company shares as liabilities, the sector had positive net worth. Or, the ratio of market 
capitalization to the value of assets was less than 1. (Later this ratio became known as 
Tobin’s q.) As discussed by Piketty (2009, Data Appendix, Part I, pages 33-36.), the 
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Figure B UK Housing net worth as ratio to net national income
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implications of the recorded positive net worth depend on its source. In the case of the 
US, it has been suggested by Wright (2004) that there has been a systematic over-
valuation of company assets, as a result of the use of a perpetual inventory method. 
On the other hand, to the extent that the difference represents a sustained departure of 
asset prices from their underlying value, then we may need to take them into account. 
Long ago, Clay pointed out to the “concealed assets of Joint Stock Companies which 
are not fully represented in the Stock Exchange quotations of their stock” and went on 
to say that “these should be added, probably in the main, to the estimated amount of 
the capital in the hands of persons in the higher ranges of fortunes” (1925, page 80). 
As may be seen from Figure D, the net worth of the company sector went from 
substantially positive at the end of the 1970s to substantially negative at the turn of the 
century, where “substantial” means of the order of magnitude of total national income. 
It has since returned close to zero, following, inversely, the ups and downs of the 
stock market. Expressed as a percentage of net national income, the fall from 1979 to 
2010 was some 1.2, or around half the increase in the personal wealth-income ratio 
over that period. 
 
 
 
The other important component is the balance sheet of the public sector. Net worth 
(not taking account of pension liabilities) is shown in Figure D. During the period 
before 1979, the public sector moved from a position where the national debt 
exceeded the value of assets by an amount of around half national income to a positive 
position, with a wealth-national income ratio of 1.3. In the next 30 years, the net worth 
of the state declined back to zero. In effect, the state transferred title in much of its 
real assets to individual households: the state net worth fell by an amount equal to 
some half of the increase in the personal wealth-income ratio over this period.  
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Figure C UK National wealth as ratio to net national income
Excluding housing
5 
 
 
 
To sum up, the rise in national wealth in the first part of the post-war period was 
associated with increased net worth in the corporate and public sectors; in the second 
half of the period, these gains were, at least in part, transferred to the personal sector. 
Both corporate and public net worth were transferred to future generations, but the 
inheritance takes a different form – with different distributional consequences – now 
that the wealth is in the hands of the personal sector. 
 
3.  Inheritance in the UK: Sources and methods 
 
Economic advantage is passed on from generation to generation in several ways, of 
which the most important is probably human capital. Here we are concerned with the 
transmission of material wealth such as real property, cash, financial assets, and 
company shares. Transfers may be made at death in the form of estates or made as 
gifts inter vivos. Our aim is to measure the annual total of such transfers. The flows 
are gross flows, that is we do not treat gifts given (or estates left) as negative entries. 
Where, for example, a person receives an inheritance of X from a parent and 
immediately transfers this to a child as a gift inter vivos, this counts as a total transfer 
of 2X.  
 
Our concern is with the aggregate of transfers, not their distribution. It is quite 
possible that estates are left, not to children, but to more distant relatives or indeed 
persons not related. A small but significant amount is left to charities (Atkinson, 
Backus and Micklewright, 2009). All of these transfers are counted here as inter-
generational transfers. At the same time, transfers do not necessarily go from 
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generation t to generation t+1. Wealth can be transferred sideways to another member 
of the same generation or could skip a generation. The latter would cause the extent of 
wealth transfers to be under-stated. An investigation into estates arising from deaths in 
the UK in 2000/01 (reported on HMRC website, Table 12.9) suggested however that 
grandchildren received a relatively small proportion of the bequests by value: 3.6 per 
cent (of the total excluding transfers to charities). 
 
The most common “sideways” transfer is from husband to wife or vice versa. Ideally, 
we should like to exclude such within-generation transfers (including those from 
brother to sister or cousin), but this is not always possible, and to this extent the 
degree of inter-generational transfer is over-stated. The investigation into estates 
arising from deaths in the UK in 2000/01 showed that a large part of the estates left by 
married men (82.0 per cent) and married women (72.2 per cent) was left to the 
spouse.1 (In these calculations, charitable transfers have again been omitted.) These 
inter-spousal transfers accounted for 17.9 per cent of the value of transfers in that 
year. This is rather higher than the 10 per cent reported for France by Piketty (2011, 
footnote 36). The percentage passing to children was 49.2 per cent, which is quite a lot 
lower than the 70 per cent reported for France. In the UK, “other relatives” received 
19.0 per cent, and “strangers in blood” 10.3 per cent. The estimates of Karagiannaki 
(2011a, Tables 1 and 2) give higher figures for inter-spousal transfers, averaging 30 
per cent over the period 2002-2005, which she finds compares well with the survey 
reports of inheritances.  
 
Estate statistics 
The transfer of wealth at death has long been the subject of taxation. Our period opens 
with the enactment of the modern Estate Duty (ED) in the 1894 Harcourt Budget that 
unified death duties on personal and real property. Estate Duty was replaced by 
Capital Transfer Tax (CTT) in 1975 and that in turn was replaced by Inheritance Tax 
(IHT) in 1986. The information used here comes from the published administrative 
data for these three taxes covering years since 1896. Up to 1973, the data cover Great 
Britain (i.e. England, Wales and Scotland), thus avoiding any discontinuity when the 
(now) Republic of Ireland left the United Kingdom in 1921. (Although it should be 
noted that the national income figures used as a denominator relate to Great Britain 
plus Northern Ireland.) The sources are shown in Table 1 in the Appendix. It should 
be noted that the period covered is much shorter than that for France – 113 years, 
compared with 183 years – but that there are fewer missing observations: 13, 
compared with 49. In particular, the regular collection of estate data stopped in France 
in 1964, and the information used by Piketty (2011) for subsequent years comes from 
samples of the tax returns taken for the years 1977, 1984, 1987, 1994, 2000 and 2006. 
The last 45 years are better covered in the UK.   
 
1  A small-scale study carried out in 1981 produced similar results (Inland Revenue Statistics 
1984, Table 4.7). Of the estates left by married men, 83 per cent by value (before duty but 
after subtracting charitable bequests) was left to the spouse, and 74.5 per cent for married 
women. Overall, men left 32.4 per cent, and women 42.8 per cent, to children or 
grandchildren. 
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The “raw” estate information has to be corrected for 
 Estates below the tax threshold (“non-filers”); 
 Under-valuation or exemption of certain classes of assets; 
 Wealth transferred before death: gifts inter vivos. 
The addition of the wealth transferred by non-filers is of minor importance (although 
it smoothes out the abrupt change when there is a large increase in the tax threshold in 
1946), but the other two elements are potentially larger.  
 
The three elements are discussed in turn. Considerable use is made of the adjustments 
applied in studies of the distribution of wealth among the living. At the same time, it 
should be noted that not all these adjustments are relevant, given that our focus here is 
on the transmission of wealth between generations. For example, these studies adjust 
by adding back amounts paid in funeral expenses (Atkinson and Harrison, 1978, page 
299), but these are genuine deductions from the amount transmitted and so no such 
correction is made here. In the same way, adjustments are made in the wealth 
estimates for joint property, such as a house, passing on the death of one spouse to the 
other. Since we would like in principle to exclude such sideways transfers, no such 
adjustment is made here when calculating transmitted wealth. 
 
Non-filers 
The estate returns today in the UK cover some 45-50 per cent of the number of deaths 
of persons aged 20 and over – see Figure E. This is a rather smaller percentage than 
the 65 per cent reported by Piketty for France (2011, page 1097), but it is not too 
different. On the other hand, there has – in contrast to France - been considerable 
variation in the coverage of the statistics over time. This reflects both changes in the 
exemption level and changes in statistical practice. When the modern Estate Duty was 
introduced by Harcourt in 1896, some 15 per cent of estates were liable for tax. Since 
the threshold remained at £100 from 1896 to 1945, the proportion rose steadily, 
reaching 40 per cent at the end of the Second World War. The threshold was then 
increased sharply to £2,000, and, as a result, the proportion liable for tax fell to around 
10 per cent.2 There was then a downward trend until the mid-1990s.3 On the other 
hand, from 1960, the statistics cover all estates brought to the attention of the 
authorities, and this gives a much larger proportion – between 40 and 50 per cent. The 
estates covered are those that are dutiable and those where there is a grant of 
representation (grant of confirmation in Scotland). (The grant is the legal document 
that allows the executors or administrators to deal with a deceased person’s estate.)  
 
  
2  The sharp reduction in the number of estates covered is shown in Table 216 in 95th AR, 
where the number for GB falls from 204,000 to 53,000.   
3  As is demonstrated by Hills and Glennerster (2013), the RPI-adjusted threshold varied around 
a constant real level until the late 1980s and then began to rise (see their Figure 8.1). As they 
stress, the threshold exhibited considerable variation relative to house prices, to which it 
became linked since October 2007. This led to variation in the proportion of estates above the 
threshold - see Figure E below. 
8 
 
                                              
 
 
What is the wealth of the “excluded population” not covered by the estate statistics? 
The tax authorities (previously the Inland Revenue (IR), now Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC)) have in recent years sought to reconcile the estimates of 
wealth obtained from by multiplying up the estate data with the figures given in the 
national balance sheets (for example Table 13.3 on the HMRC website, archive 
tables). For 2005, the estimated wealth of the excluded population was around a 
quarter of the recorded wealth, but the greatest part of this was accounted for by 
property held jointly (typically where a couple own a house jointly). Since we are not 
concerned here with such “sideways transfers”, we have considered only the “small 
estates”, which are some 2 per cent of the recorded wealth. The figures are linearly 
interpolated where there are no IR/HMRC estimates.  
 
In order to go back to years before 1971 (the earliest IR estimate), we make use of the 
estimates of the wealth of the excluded population made by Atkinson and Harrison 
(1978). We link to the IR/HMRC series the central estimates for 1923 to 1972 of 
Atkinson and Harrison (1978, Table VI.1, column B3), extended to 1981 in Atkinson, 
Gordon, and Harrison (1989).4 We have adjusted the England and Wales estimates 
(for 1923 to 1938) to a Great Britain basis by simply multiplying by the ratio of the 
Great Britain to England and Wales populations. The Atkinson and Harrison estimates 
are not fully appropriate, as they include jointly held property, although this was then 
smaller in value, since the rate of owner-occupation was lower. The estimates have the 
advantage that they make provision for the “jump” in the series between 1959 and 
4  The gaps in the series from 1931 to 1935, 1937, and 1939-1941, are filled by linear 
interpolation. The gap from 1946 to 1949 was filled by extrapolating backwards the 1950 
figure on the basis of the change in the total personal wealth series. 
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Figure E Coverage of estate data and estate tax in Britain 1896-2008
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1960, allowing for the much larger proportion, some 90 per cent, not covered between 
1946 and 1959. The estimates were based on an exercise that involved examining, by 
asset type, the implications of the higher level of exclusion. This procedure was based 
on the work of earlier researchers such as Clay (1925), Campion (1939), and Lydall 
and Tipping (1961). The calculations made here of the wealth of the excluded 
population for the period 1896 to 1922 follow the approach of Clay (1925) for 1912 
and 1921. The methods are described in the Appendix.  
 
We have now to go from the wealth of the excluded population to the amount 
bequeathed in any one year. This depends on the mortality among the excluded 
population, about which we have no direct information. We have to apply the reverse 
of a mortality multiplier. For the present, a simple multiplier of 30 has been assumed 
to apply throughout the period. The addition for non-filers is small in most years, but 
it does make a significant difference for the period from 1946 to 1959, when the data 
did not cover any estates below the threshold. The corrected series gives a more 
accurate picture of the changes over time.  
 
Under-valuation or exemption of certain classes of assets 
The adjustments considered here concern (i) the possible under- or over- valuation of 
assets transferred through inheritance and (ii) the omission of assets through tax 
avoidance. No account is taken of evasion. In 1967, Revell commented that “most 
people would probably agree that [evasion] is at a low level in Britain – if only 
because the legal methods of avoidance are so many” (1967, page 112).5 Both 
valuation and omission are affected by the changing forms of capital taxation, which 
impact on both behaviour and the statistical recording. In what follows, reference is 
made to some of the relevant provisions, but no attempt is made to follow all the 
changes that have taken place over more than a century. 
 
There are several reasons why the valuation may depart from that needed here. The 
Inland Revenue (HMRC) has identified these in their studies of total personal wealth 
and their reconciliation of the wealth estimates obtained from estate data with the 
national balance sheets. As noted above, in some cases the adjustments do not apply 
here. For example, they adjust life policies on the grounds that the estate data value 
the policies at the amount paid on death, whereas in the hands of the living their value 
is less. Here we are interested in the sum passed on, so that the estate valuation is 
correct. 
 
Certain of the adjustments for valuation that are relevant here affect specific classes of 
asset. For example Inland Revenue research into estates below the threshold found 
that the value of dwellings in such estates had been underestimated by some 15 per 
cent, leading to an overall increase of some 10 per cent in the valuation of houses 
5  At the time of the introduction of the modern Estate Duty there was much discussion of the 
risk of increased evasion. The fall in revenue that had been feared did not materialise, and the 
Inland Revenue noted in in its Annual Report of 1895 that “the fears of evasion … were 
exaggerated” (38th AR, page 52). 
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(Central Statistical Office, 1978, page 46). Or the adjustment may affect several asset 
classes. For example, the valuation has been affected by the time lags between death 
and the appearance of the estates in the statistics. Given a general tendency for asset 
prices to rise, this leads to an under-statement. The Inland Revenue estimated that for 
the years 1965 to 1975, the average under-statement was some 2½ per cent (Central 
Statistical Office, 1978, page 43).6 The official statistics switched to a “year of death 
basis” with effect from 1980 (see Inland Revenue Statistics 1984, page 42).  
 
The second type of adjustment is for property that does not have to be notified for 
probate. Under Estate Duty, in addition to small estates, and jointly-owned property 
passing on death, this included most property held in discretionary trusts, 
accumulation and maintenance fund property, and property held in settlements on a 
surviving spouse (Dunn and Hoffman, 1983, page 39). Certain assets are not included 
in the estate because they are taxed separately, for example the special provision 
introduced in 1909 whereby growing timber is not taxed until it is sold. It should be 
noted that certain assets attract a lower rate of duty, such as farm or business assets, 
but the full value is in principle recorded in the statistics. The geographical coverage 
may lead to certain assets being excluded, such as immovable property situated 
overseas until the Finance Act 1962, or incorrectly included, such as certain property 
belonging to persons domiciled in other countries. In addition, from 1896 until 1914, 
Settlement Estate Duty was in force. Settled property on which duty had been once 
paid was not liable a second time and as a result a substantial amount of settled 
property was missing from the estate statistics.  
 
Faced with this variety of problems, it is not easy to estimate correction factors, but 
the research undertaken by the Inland Revenue provides a valuable basis for the years 
since 1971. They have regularly supplied tables showing the different steps in going 
from the multiplied-up net worth of the personal sector as identified on the basis of the 
estate data to the balance sheet estimates. Here I have not taken the adjustments for 
life policies, pension rights, consumer durables, or small estates (already included 
above), or joint property (for the reason explained above). In terms of the adjustments 
listed in Central Statistical Office (1978, page 42), I have taken adjustments 1 to 4 
(later labeled “under-recording” and 7 (“excluded trusts”). These adjustments have 
varied as a percentage of the total identified wealth, but were around 15 per cent from 
the 1970s through to the early 1990s, when they rose to around 25 per cent. It has to 
be recognized that the adjustments apply to estimated wealth, and do not necessarily 
apply to estates. The allocation depends on the age/gender mix (see Dunn and 
Hoffman, 1983). This means that any attribution is at best approximate. Rather than 
using the figures for individual years, I therefore simply assume an adjustment of 15 
per cent from 1971 to 1995 and 25 per cent thereafter. For the excluded trusts, the 
early Inland Revenue estimates were of the order of 5 per cent, but following the work 
of Robson and Timmins (1988) they arrived at estimates which were “much lower 
than those previously used, but are considered to be more accurate” (Inland Revenue 
6  Insofar as the adjustment is to an end of year basis, this is not appropriate for our purposes.  
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Statistics 1988, page 85). The revised estimates were some 1 per cent of identified 
wealth, and this figure has been used throughout the period.  
 
For earlier years, we have to turn to the limited estimates that have been made in the 
past. It should be noted that the precise basis for these estimates is not always 
apparent. Campion (1939, page 18) gives an estimate for 1911 of £51-£59 million for 
settled property passing at death excluded from the estate duty returns, or some 20 per 
cent of total estates in that year. The estimate of Campion for 1926-8 is much lower, 
as we would expect given the ending in 1914 of the separate Settlement Estate Duty: 
£20-£30 million, or some 5 per cent. In their estimates for 1954, Lydall and Tipping 
added to their total of £40 billion for personal wealth a further £1 billion (2½ per cent) 
for discretionary trusts (1961, page). For 1961, Revell (1967, pages 137 and 138) 
estimated a much smaller £350 million (0.5 per cent of £78 billion), which is, 
interestingly, closer to the 1 per cent taken here for the 1970s. There are some reasons 
for supposing that the “under-recording” adjustment would have been smaller in the 
past, given the lower rate of owner-occupation, and the lower rate of asset price 
increase. In view of this, I have simply applied a 10 per cent adjustment for both 
elements (under-valuation and exempt settled property) for the period 1915-1971, and 
20 per cent for 1896-1914. 
 
Gifts inter vivos 
Gifts inter vivos are an obvious route to avoid death duties, and gifts made in a period 
prior to death have for this reason been taxed under death duties. The gross amount of 
gifts began to be reported in the Estate Duty statistics from 1897.7 The period covered 
was initially a year, but was extended in 1910 to three years. The period for which 
gifts were subject to duty was increased in 1946 to five years, and in 1968 to seven 
years. To further complicate matters, the Finance Act 1960 provided that where gifts 
were made in the third, fourth and fifth years before death, their value should be 
reduced for tax purposes by 15, 30 and 60 per cent respectively. Estate Duty was 
replaced by Capital Transfer Tax (CTT) in 1975, which extended the tax to all lifetime 
transfers (those made after 26 March 1974). This provision was short-lived, being 
replaced by a ten year period, which was in effect from 27 July 1981 to 18 March 
1986. The Finance Act 1986 introduced the current Inheritance Tax, replacing CTT, 
levied on assets left at death and gifts made within seven years of death, with the 
charge tapered depending on the period between the gift and death.  
 
The incomplete taxation of gifts inter vivos means that the UK data on gifts are much 
less complete than those in France, where in principle all gifts are recorded. This 
seriously limits the extent to which we can correct the estate figures for the missing 
gifts inter vivos. At the same time, a number of attempts have been made, using 
different methods, to estimate the extent of gifts inter vivos in the UK. The researchers 
7  Details are provided in Sandford (1971). He points out that the early figures were gross 
amounts but that net amounts were also given from 1919 to 1930. From his Table B1, it may 
be seen that the net and gross amounts are very close, and no distinction is drawn here. 
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have all recognized the considerable limitations of the estimates, but they provide 
some basis for quantification. 
  
The first attempt, to my knowledge, is that of Wedgwood (1929 (1939)). He made use 
of the fact that “voluntary dispositions” of certain classes of asset were taxable under 
the Stamp Duties. This applied independently of the time when they were made, so in 
principle all gifts in the relevant classes were covered. But the partial coverage and 
exemptions meant that the estimate based on gifts paying Stamp Duty was a lower 
bound. As put by Wedgwood, “we know what it must exceed, by referring to the 
figures of gifts taxed for Stamp Duty” (1929 (1939), page 245), but we do not know 
how much more is transferred in exempt forms, which include British Government 
stocks, cash, bearer bonds, household goods, and transfers below the Stamp Duty 
exemption limit.  
 
The charge under Stamp Duty was introduced in the Finance Act 1910, and the data 
therefore start in 1910. The charge on gifts was abolished with effect from 1985. The 
series therefore covers a considerable part, but not all, of the period. The data were 
used by Whalley (1974), following the suggestion of Prest (1973), to make estimates 
for the period 1960 to 1971. Here I have used the full run of available years from 1910 
to 1984 – see Figure F. Unfortunately, the data do not record the total transferred but 
the net receipt of duty. It is therefore necessary to gross-up the recorded amounts. The 
procedure used here, as in Whalley (1974), is to assume the “standard” rate of duty, 
which was 1 per cent at the outset, but which has been 2 per cent in two periods. 
Grossing up by a factor of 100 or 50 does however under-state the total, since there 
were reduced rates on smaller transfers. Some check can be made from a second set of 
figures, published up to 1976, of the valuations undertaken by the Valuation Office in 
relation to the Duty. These valuations however are only made for certain classes of 
transfer, so that they would understate the total. The results in Figure F suggest that 
the valuation-based numbers move over time in a similar manner to the grossed-up 
duty estimates, with the valuation numbers (usually) below the grossed-up estimates. 
This is re-assuring. Finally, we should note that the estimates are of total gifts, some 
of which would fall within the period for which they would be taxable (and hence 
would already have been included). Whalley made corrections for the years 1960 to 
1965 to subtract those gifts that were subsequently caught by Estate Duty (and 
therefore have already been counted in the estate totals). Around a quarter were taxed 
under the 5 year period, and around a third for the 7 year period. Overall, Whalley 
concluded that a minimum of 10 per cent of wealth passes via gifts and that a 
minimum of 7 per cent avoided Estate Duty. He goes on to say that “one certainly 
cannot exclude the possibility of the stamp duty statistics only capturing one-half of 
gifts actually made” (1974, page 642).  
 
The second method uses the data on gifts “caught” by Estate Duty under the n-year 
rule, under which gifts become taxable if death occurs within n years. This method 
was proposed by Tait (1967, Appendix II) and applied in Atkinson (1972, page 127) 
to estimate that the gifts avoiding Estate Duty in 1966 amounted to £350 million, 
adding around a fifth to the total transferred. As was noted by Whalley (1974, page 
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642), such an estimate would be consistent with the Stamp Duty approach if the latter 
were capturing only a half. We should also note that Sandford, studying the 
development of the amount of gifts caught by the rule from 1898, expressed as a 
percentage of the total estates, concluded that “there has clearly been a secular upward 
trend in the amount of giving since the introduction of estate duty” (1971, page 87). 
The same conclusion was drawn by Horsman (1975). For the period 1960 to 1971 he 
found “a growing tendency for wealth-holders to try to avoid duty by means of gifts” 
(1975, page 522). In Figure F, the Estate Duty-based figure shows the amount of gifts 
caught by the n-year rule, expressed as a percentage of total estates. The effect of the 
extension of n from 1 to 3 can be seen from the jump in 1910, and from 5 to 7 from 
the rise after 1968. Unfortunately, the published Estate Duty statistics do not show the 
gifts caught by Duty for the period 1931 to 1959. 
 
 
 
The Estate Duty method multiplies up the total recorded gifts to allow for those where 
the donor did not die within the specified period. The central objection to the 
calculations of Tait and Atkinson, as noted by Sandford (1971, page 87n), is that they 
applied a single mortality multiplier to the estate totals without allowing for the 
pattern by age. Horsman (1975) was able to use the Inland Revenue multipliers 
appropriate for the relevant age/sex group. He found that the total gifts were £413 
million in 1967/8 and £396 million in 1968/9, implying overall mortality multipliers 
of 9.9 and 8.7, respectively. They represented 23.7 and 20.6 per cent of the total gross 
value of estates in the two years – close to the fifth found earlier. Horsman went on to 
estimate that the amounts of gifts avoiding Duty were £352 million and £322 million 
(20.2 per cent and 16.8 per cent of total gross estates).  
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The vertical scales in Figure F are such that, if the gifts caught for Estate Duty were 
multiplied by 4, then they would be comparable with the scale for the gift estimates 
based on Stamp Duty. If the latter are under-stated by a factor of 2, then the two sets 
of figures would be broadly in agreement if the appropriate mortality multiplier were 
8 (i.e. 4 x 2). This would be close to those derived by Horsman. It should be noted that 
this takes no account of the variations in the period for which gifts were subject to 
duty.  
 
Taking the evidence from both these sources in the round, there seems therefore to be 
grounds for adding to the estate totals a figure of around 15-20 per cent in the late 
1960s. This was indeed the conclusion of the Royal Commission on the Distribution 
of Income and Wealth: “the Inland Revenue statistics of estates may underestimate the 
amount of wealth passing by as much as 15-20 per cent because of the omission of 
gifts falling outside the 7-year period” (1977, page 279). The time-path in Figure 5 
suggests that the adjustment in the 1950s would be smaller – around 10 per cent – and 
more like 5 per cent before the Second World War. The evidence for recent years is 
less easy to interpret, in view of the changes in taxation. There is however a further 
source - sample surveys that have been exploited in the recent study by Karagiannaki 
(2011b). In particular, making use of the Attitudes to Inheritance Survey, conducted in 
2004, she estimates that aggregate gifts are about 10 per cent of total inheritances. In 
view of these findings, I make the – approximate – additions for gifts inter vivos not 
captured in the estate figures: 5 per cent addition prior to 1945, 10 per cent from 1945 
to 1959, 15 per cent for the 1960s and 1970s, and 10 per cent after 1979. It is however 
quite possible that the adjustment under-states the extent of gifts inter vivos. As is 
noted by Karagiannaki and Hills, “none of the available data sources appears to 
capture the whole picture” (2013, page 116). 
 
4.  A return of inheritance in Britain? 
The end results of the calculations described in the previous section are given in Table 
2, which shows the aggregate wealth transmitted each year over the period 1896 to 
2008. In considering these results, it is important to bear in mind the number of 
assumptions made in arriving at the estimates and the qualifications that surround 
them. The figures over-state the intergenerational transmission of wealth on account 
of sideways transfers; they under-state insofar as there are transfers that skip 
generations. The adjustments for undervaluation, for exempt property and for gifts 
inter vivos are all very approximate. The extent of gifts may well be under-stated.  
 
The time-path of transmitted wealth is illustrated in Figure G. This demonstrates the 
major importance of inheritance before the First World War, when the adjusted total 
represented some 20 per cent when expressed relative to net national income. In the 
inter-war period, the adjusted total was around 15 per cent, falling to some 10 per cent 
after the Second World War, and then falling further to reach 5 per cent in the late 
1970s. The question posed in the title of this section asks whether there has since been 
an upturn in inheritance. The answer depends on the standard of comparison. From the 
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evidence summarized in Figure G, the ratio of transmitted wealth to national income 
has risen since 1977. The unadjusted ratio was 3.4 and rose to 5.8 in 2006, falling 
back after the financial crisis to 5.4 in 2008. The adjusted figure showed a rise from 
4.8 in 1977 to 8.2 in 2006, a rise of more than 3 percentage points. On the other hand, 
this increase was more or less in line with the increase in personal wealth, so that 
Figure H shows a downward trend until 1990, followed by a leveling-off. When 
people deny that inheritance has returned, then they may well have in mind the fact 
that it has not increased in relation to total wealth. In the US, for example, Wolff and 
Gittleman find “little evidence of an inheritance “boom”. [From 1989 to 2007] wealth 
transfers as a proportion of current net worth fell sharply … by 10 percentage points” 
(2011, page 1). 
 
 
 
The fact that bequests in the UK seem to have tracked personal wealth in recent 
decades does not however undercut the importance of this development. The rise 
relative to national income is what matters for taxable capacity. At a marginal tax rate 
of a third, a rise of 3 percentage points would add 1 percentage point of national 
income to potential tax revenue, making a significant contribution to reducing the 
deficit. Moreover, as discussed in Section 2, the rise in personal wealth reflects, in 
part, the fall in the net worth of the public and corporate sectors, and this development 
has implications for the distributional justice and for the economy. In the case of 
company shares, it could be argued that these were in the past under-valued. When a 
person passed on shares to their children, the underlying value of these shares was in 
the past greater than the stock market valuation. We should have imputed the net 
worth of the corporate sector to the holders of company shares. Seen in this light, part 
of the fall in bequests in the early 1970s may have been due to falling stock prices, 
with their counterpart in rising net worth of the corporate sector. To this extent, the 
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answer may be, not that inheritance has returned, but that it never really went away. 
On the other hand, as argued by Piketty (2009, Data Appendix, page 34), no such 
adjustment should be made where the fall in corporate net worth was simply a 
correction of an earlier over-valuation. And this argument does not apply to the net 
worth of the public sector, where privatization changed the reality and not just the 
form of ownership. The government policy created individual property rights to what 
had previously been communal wealth, and the transmission of private wealth 
increased on this account. 
 
 
 
The basic accounting equation used by Piketty (2011) is that the ratio of transmitted 
wealth, B, to national income, Y, is equal in year t to  
 
 Bt/Yt = mt μt* Wt/Yt 
 
where mt is the mortality rate, μt* is the ratio of the average wealth of decedents 
(corrected for gifts inter vivos) relative to the average wealth of the living, and Wt 
denotes total personal wealth. Another way of expressing the relationship is that the 
ratio of transmitted wealth to total personal wealth is equal to bt = mtμt*. In the case of 
France, he observed that: 
“the historical decline in the mortality mt seems to have been (partially) 
compensated by an increase in the μt* ratio. Consequently, the product 
of the two, that is the inheritance-wealth ratio bwt = mtμt*, declined 
much less than the mortality rate. … This is the central fact that needs to 
be explained” (2011, page 1105).  
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Figure I shows the ratio bt for the UK. It may be seen that the mortality rate (for 
persons aged 20 and over) was broadly constant from 1896 to the 1970s, whereas the 
implied value of μ* (dividing bt by mt) rose in the 1920s and then fell until the end of 
the 1970s, when it leveled off and began to rise in the 1990s. The situation described 
by Piketty, with mortality declining and μ* rising, applied therefore to the most recent 
part of the upturn in inheritance. From 1977 to 2006, the rise in the B/Y ratio by a 
factor of 1.69 can be seen as the product of 0.75 (mortality decline) 1.23 (rise in μ*) 
and 1.83 (rise in W/Y). In contrast, the earlier upturn, from 1921 to 1932 by a factor 
of 1.54 can be seen as the product of 1.06 (slight mortality increase) 1.03 (virtually 
constant μ*) and 1.41 (rise in W/Y).   
 
 
 
5.  Comparison with France  
This paper originated as a response to the challenge of Piketty (2011) who looked at 
the overall wealth-income ratio for the UK (and the US) but not at the estate data. The 
conclusion he drew about the UK, on the basis of admittedly piecemeal data, was that 
the private wealth-national income ratio was 6.5 to 7.5 at the end of the nineteenth 
century, down to 3.5 to 4 in the 1950s-1970s, and up at 4.5 to 5.5 at the end of the 
twentieth century. Here I have linked different series for the UK back to 1920. As may 
be seen from Figure J, the French and UK series are remarkably close in the latter 
decades, showing a rise from 3 to 5 from the end of the 1970s to the present. The 
figures were also close at the outbreak of the Second World War, but in the 
intervening period were rather different. In France the rise in the ratio started in the 
1950s; in the UK, the fall was less steep in wartime but continued until the mid-1970s. 
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The inter-war period was also different. The ratios were close in 1920, but then 
followed a different trajectory. 
 
 
 
How do these similarities and differences play out in terms of inheritance? Figure K 
reproduces the estimates of Piketty for France (covering here only over the shorter – 
113 year – period for which we have UK estimates). It shows in particular the major 
contribution of gifts inter vivos to the recent up-turn. The raw estate data show a rise 
in the bequest-national income ratio from 1.4 per cent in 1950 to 3.7 per cent in 2006, 
whereas the adjusted figure rises from 2.5 to 11 per cent. The rise from 1977 to 2006 
is by a factor of 1.61 (unadjusted) and 2.39 (adjusted). The upward adjustment for 
gifts inter vivos in France is over 80 per cent in the 2000s. 
 
The contribution of gifts is one reason that the upturn is more marked in France than 
in the UK – see Figure L, where transmitted wealth, adjusted for both countries, is 
shown as a percentage of national income. In terms of the earlier decomposition, the 
rise in the B/Y ratio in France by a factor of 2.39 between 1977 and 2006 can be seen 
as the product of 0.79 (mortality decline) 1.75 (rise in μ*) and 1.74 (rise in W/Y). The 
first is very similar to the UK (0.75), and the third is quite close (1.83 in the UK). The 
difference is in μ* (1.23 in the UK). It is quite possible that the UK estimates have 
under-stated gifts. Such an under-statement would also account for the differing 
directions of change in transmitted wealth expressed as a percentage of total personal 
wealth – see Figure M.  
 
The other striking difference is that there was a strong recovery in the UK after the 
First World War, and less of a fall after the Second World War, which took the 
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transmitted wealth to a level that was higher than in France for a sustained period 
(leaving aside the war years for which there are no UK data) from 1920 to the late 
1970s. As a result, the weight of accumulated transmitted wealth must have been 
higher in the UK.  
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Finally, it should be noted that in the UK, with its freedom of bequest, it is possible 
that the estate figures include more sideways transfers, particularly inter-spousal, than 
is the case in France, and to this degree over-state the extent of inter-generational 
transmission. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
Changes in the extent of aggregate inheritance can have major economic and social 
consequences. A society where each year people can expect to receive in inheritance a 
sum of around a fifth of total income is very different from one where the sum is 
around a fiftieth. The repercussions are likely to be seen in the labour market, in 
investment opportunities, and in the housing market. In the UK, the level of 
transmitted wealth has not reached the 12 per cent in France (in 2006); nor did it fall 
so low. Expressed as a percentage of national income, transmitted wealth fell to under 
5 per cent in the 1970s and has risen to around 8 per cent. (The figure would be lower 
if all inter-spousal transfers were subtracted, but would be higher if gifts inter vivos 
are understated.) The significance of an 8 per cent figure should not be under-stated. 
In 2008/9 it was the same percentage as that of private pensions and annuities in total 
gross household income (ONS, 2013, Table 14). In this context, we should note that 
the taxation of wealth transfers was in the past a significant source of government 
revenue. If inheritance is returning, then we need to look again at its role as a basis for 
taxation. As is shown in Figure N, until the Second World War a UK citizen was, 
statistically, more likely to pay Estate Duty at death than to pay income tax while 
living. This is far from the case today, and this underlies calls for a reformed capital 
receipts tax, as proposed by the Mirrlees Review (2011) (and by Atkinson, 1972).  
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Appendix: Data sources and tables 
1. Total national and personal income 
The national income series is from Mitchell (1988, pages 828-830) up to 1980, then 
the National Income Blue Books 1997, 2004 and 2010, Table 1.1.  
 
2. Total personal wealth 
The personal wealth series is compiled by linking several different series, with 
definitions that are not necessarily identical. It works back from the HMRC series for 
total marketable wealth, 1990-2005 from the HMRC website, Table 13.4, 1984 to 
1989 from Inland Revenue Statistics (IRS) 2000, Table 13.4, 1981 to 1983 from IRS 
1998, Table 13.4, 1979 to 1980 from IRS 1996, Table 13.4, 1976 to 1978 from IRS 
1992, Table 11.4, linked at 1976 to series 1948 to 1976 from Blake and Orszag, 1999, 
Table 12 (not including pension wealth), linked at 1948 to series 1920-1948 from 
Solomou and Weale, 1997, Table 6 (net personal wealth including durables). The 
series has been extrapolated beyond 2005 in line with household net worth as given in 
the National Income Blue Book 2011, Table 10.10. 
 
3. Mortality rates  
The series for total deaths at age 20 and over from 1911 onwards is from the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics (AAS) and its predecessor, the Statistical Abstract for the United 
Kingdom (StA): 1911 to 1925 from StA 1911-1925, Table 21, where the deaths for 
the age group 15-19 has been taken as half that for 15-24; 1926 to 1930 from StA 
1913 and 1917-1930, Table 24, where the deaths for the age group 15-19 has been 
taken as half that for 15-24; 1932 to 1941 from AAS 1935-1946, Tables 20 and 21; 
1942 to 1965 from AAS 1966, Tables 28-31; 1966 to 1978 from AAS 1981, Table 
2.29; 1980 and 1981 from AAS 2002, Table 5.18, 1982-1996 from AAS 2004, Table 
5.19, and 1997-2008 from AAS 2010, Table 5.19. These figures relate to the calendar 
year.  
The series from 1896 to 1910 is derived from the Annual Report of the Registrar-
General for England and Wales (AR) and the Annual Report of the Registrar-General 
for Scotland (SAR) as follows: 1896 (AR1896, page 118 and SAR1896, page xxii), 
1897 (AR1897, page 120 and SAR1897, Table IV), 1898 (AR1898, page 120 and 
SAR1898, Table IV), 1899 (AR1899, page 122 and SAR1899, Table IV), 1900 
(AR1900, page 122 and SAR1900, Table IV), 1901 (AR1901, page 124 and 
SAR1901, page xxii), 1902 (AR1902, page 124 and SAR1902, page xxii), 1903 
(AR1903, page 126 and SAR1903, page xxiv), 1904 (AR1904, page 128 and 
SAR1904, page xxv), 1905 (AR1905, page 254 and SAR1905, Table IV), 1906 
(AR1906, page 264 and SAR1906, Table IV), 1907 (AR1907, page 280 and 
SAR1907, Table IV), 1908 (AR1908, page 292 and SAR1908, Table IV), 1909 
(AR1909, page 284 and SAR1909, Table IV), and 1910 (AR1910, page 278 and 
SAR1910, page 4). These again relate to the calendar year.  
  
4. Wealth of the excluded population 1896-1923 
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The method is similar to that used by Clay (1925) to make estimates for 1912 and 
1921. His total is made up of household goods plus “working-class savings”. For 
household goods, we have taken the 1921 figure of Clay and assumed a constant real 
value in other years, applying the ONS composite consumer price index. For each of 
the savings categories, we have obtained comparable series for the totals of each type, 
using the sources listed below. It should be noted that we have not included the funds 
of Friendly Societies, Trade Unions, of the National Health Insurance Fund, nor the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund, on the grounds that these do not form part of 
inheritance. This reduces Clay’s UK total for 1912 from £546 million to £452 million. 
Clay adjusts his total by a factor to allow for the part of these types of saving that are 
held by those covered by the estate duty statistics. He adjusts by subtracting 14 per 
cent in 1912 and 21 per cent in 1921. Here we have instead followed the estimates 
made by Radice (1939) – see Atkinson and Harrison (1978, pages 302-3) – of the 
proportions attributable to the excluded population.  
 
1. Savings Banks deposits: Post Office 
From Mitchell, 1988, pages 671-2. 
2.  : Trustee Ordinary Departments (railway not included)  
From Mitchell, 1988, pages 671-2.       
3.   Trustee Special Investment Departments 
From Mitchell, 1988, pages 671-2. 
4. Government stock held by Post Office and Trustee Savings Banks 
From StA 1890-1904 (Cd 2622), Tables 88 and 89, StA 1899-1913 (Cd 
7636), Tables 93 and 94, StA 1910-1924, Tables 88 and 89. 
5. Building societies 
From StA 1890-1904, Table 92, StA 1899-1913, Table 98, StA 1906-
1920, Table 87, StA 1908-1922, Table 84 (GB figures extrapolated), 
StA StA 1910-1924, Table 92, figure for 1923 based on proportionate 
growth in share capital (change in form of table), which agrees with 
increase in deposits shown in Radice (1939, Table VII).  
6. Industrial co-operative societies 
From StA 1890-1904, Table 93, StA 1899-1913, Table 99, StA 1908-22, 
Table 85, StA 1910-24, Table 93 (increase of 1923 over 1922 used to 
link to earlier series), where sum of share capital and amounts due to 
depositors is used to link to 1912 and 1921 figures given by Clay (a 
linear fit to these two numbers).  
7. Registered Friendly societies (not included) 
From Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies for the year 
ending 31 December 1899, page 36, for the year ending 31 December 
1901, page 29, year ending 31 December 1901, page 25, year ending 31 
December 1903, page 28, year ending 31 December 1904, page 31. Year 
ending 31 December 1907, page 48, year ending 31 December 1908, 
page 44, year ending 31 December 1909, page 42, year ending 31 
December 1910, page 37, year ending 31 December 1911, page 41, year 
ending 31 December 1912, page 60, year ending 31 December 13, page 
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80, year ending 31 December 1917, page 93, figures for 1896-7, 1900, 
1904-5, 1917-20, and 1922-3 interpolated linearly. 
8. Industrial life assurance, life funds 
Taken from StA 1890-1904, Table 94, StA 1899-1913, Table 100, then 
1914 to 1923 from Report of the Industrial Assurance Commissioner for 
the year ended 31st December 1925, page 124 (industrial assurance 
companies, to match figure of Clay), figure for 1913 interpolated.  
 
The resulting total for 1921 is £650 million, which, on the basis of Clay’s estimate of 
13.5 million persons, amounts to some £48 per head. The estate duty threshold was 
then £100. The Atkinson and Harrison central estimate for 1923 was £825 million, 
adjusted to a GB basis. As noted in the text, this included jointly held property that is 
not covered in the estimate here. 
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Table 1: Sources of UK estate data 1896 to 2008 
 
Financial 
year 
starting 
Number 
of 
estates 
000 
net 
capital 
value 
£m 
Definition Thresh-
old £ 
Country Sources: AR 
denotes Annual 
report; IRS 
denotes Inland 
Revenue 
Statistics 
1896 46.6 204.2 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1897 50.1 235.7 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1898 52.0 237.7 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1899 59.4 280.0 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1900 56.6 250.4 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1901 56.3 276.3 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1902 57.2 259.4 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1903 57.0 251.2 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1904 58.8 252.9 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1905 57.9 260.9 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1906 60.9 286.0 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1907 61.8 269.0 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1908 61.6 258.5 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1909 63.0 271.7 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1910 61.5 258.0 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1911 63.9 265.9 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1912 64.1 266.7 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1913 67.5 281.7 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
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Financial 
year 
starting 
Number 
of 
estates 
000 
net 
capital 
value 
£m 
Definition Thresh-
old £ 
Country Sources: AR 
denotes Annual 
report; IRS 
denotes Inland 
Revenue 
Statistics 
1914 68.6 292.6 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1915 74.0  Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1916 76.7  Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1917 75.1  Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1918 82.4  Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1919 94.8  Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1920 88.3 372.9 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1921 96.5 402.0 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1922 98.9 431.2 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1923 99.9 441.9 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1924 105.9 461.1 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1925 105.6 456.4 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 18 
1926 110.6 466.5 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 17 
1927 116.6 511.1 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 17 
1928 117.7 525.1 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 17 
1929 130.0 538.4 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 17 
1930 125.7 516.8 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 17 
1931 130.1 467.4 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 17 
1932 137.9 515.7 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 17 
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Financial 
year 
starting 
Number 
of 
estates 
000 
net 
capital 
value 
£m 
Definition Thresh-
old £ 
Country Sources: AR 
denotes Annual 
report; IRS 
denotes Inland 
Revenue 
Statistics 
1933 134.2 524.0 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 17 
1934 134.7 533.7 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 17 
1935 142.5 570.8 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 79th AR, 
Table 17 
1936 147.8 592.0 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 82nd AR, 
Table 17 
1937 153.9 594.7 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 82nd AR, 
Table 17 
1938 152.7 553.6 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 88th AR, 
Table 11, 
Capital from 
95th AR, 
Table 217 
1939 155.2 533.1 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 88th AR, 
Table 11, 
Capital from 
95th AR, 
Table 217 
1940 165.4 537.8 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 88th AR, 
Table 11, 
Capital from 
95th AR, 
Table 217 
1941 171.9 569.4 Net capital value of 
estates liable to ED 
100 GB 88th AR, 
Table 11, 
Capital from 
95th AR, 
Table 217 
1942 170.8  n/a 100 GB 95th AR, 
Tables 216 and 
217 
1943 185.2  n/a 100 GB 95th AR, 
Tables 216 and 
217 
1944 195.5  n/a 100 GB 95th AR, 
Tables 216 and 
217 
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Financial 
year 
starting 
Number 
of 
estates 
000 
net 
capital 
value 
£m 
Definition Thresh-
old £ 
Country Sources: AR 
denotes Annual 
report; IRS 
denotes Inland 
Revenue 
Statistics 
1945 204.3   n/a 100 GB 95th AR, 
Tables 216 and 
217 
1946 52.5 656.5 Estates above £2k 2,000 GB 95th AR, 
Tables 216 and 
217 
1947 62.1 802.9 Estates above £2k 2,000 GB 95th AR, 
Tables 216 and 
217 
1948 57.6 807.9 Estates above £2k 2,000 GB 95th AR, 
Tables 216 and 
217 
1949 64.9 819.3 Estates above £2k 2,000 GB 95th AR, 
Tables 216 and 
217 
1950 68.7 807.5 Estates above £2k 2,000 GB 95th AR, 
Tables 216 and 
217 
1951 76.9 840.9 Estates above £2k 2,000 GB 95th AR, 
Tables 216 and 
217 
1952 69.3 747.7 Estates above £2k 2,000 GB 105th AR, 
Tables 188 and 
189 
1953 71.5 751.2 Estates above £2k 2,000 GB 105th AR, 
Tables 188 and 
189 
1954 77.2 849.5 Estates above £2k 3,000 GB 105th AR, 
Tables 188 and 
189 
1955 58.4 758.1 Estates above £3k 3,000 GB 105th AR, 
Tables 188 and 
189 
1956 59.6 768.2 Estates above £3k 3,000 GB 105th AR, 
Tables 188 and 
189 
1957 60.6 780.1 Estates above £3k 3,000 GB 105th AR, 
Tables 188 and 
189 
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Financial 
year 
starting 
Number 
of 
estates 
000 
net 
capital 
value 
£m 
Definition Thresh-
old £ 
Country Sources: AR 
denotes Annual 
report; IRS 
denotes Inland 
Revenue 
Statistics 
1958 66.3 881.2 Estates above £3k 3,000 GB 105th AR, 
Tables 188 and 
189 
1959 72.2 979.3 Estates above £3k 3,000 GB 105th AR, 
Tables 188 and 
189 
1960 281.3 1,244.5 Estates recorded 3,000 GB 105th AR, 
Tables 188 and 
189 
1961 294.5 1,346.9 Estates recorded 3,000 GB 105th AR, 
Tables 188 and 
189 
1962 306.2 1,429.7 Estates recorded 4,000 GB 111th AR, 
Table 130 
1963 316.0 1,530.6 Estates recorded 5,000 GB 111th AR, 
Table 130 
1964 295.8 1,531.1 Estates recorded 5,000 GB 111th AR, 
Table 130 
1965 291.6 1,591.1 Estates recorded 5,000 GB 111th AR, 
Table 130 
1966 278.0 1,661.1 Estates recorded 5,000 GB 111th AR, 
Table 130 
1967 267.4 1,739.0 Estates recorded 5,000 GB 111th AR, 
Table 130 
1968 271.2 1,923.2 Estates recorded 5,000 GB IRS 1972, 
Tables 69 and 
72 
1969 287.2 1,948.2 Estates recorded 10,000 GB IRS 1972, 
Tables 69 and 
72 
1970 267.7 1,967.8 Estates recorded 10,000 GB IRS 1972, 
Tables 69 and 
72 
1971 288.8 2,275.0 Estates recorded 12,500 GB IRS 1976, 
Tables 90 and 
92 
1972 268.3 2,743.5 Estates recorded 15,000 GB IRS 1976, 
Tables 90 and 
92 
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Financial 
year 
starting 
Number 
of 
estates 
000 
net 
capital 
value 
£m 
Definition Thresh-
old £ 
Country Sources: AR 
denotes Annual 
report; IRS 
denotes Inland 
Revenue 
Statistics 
1973 294.4 3,126.9 Estates recorded 15,000 GB IRS 1976, 
Tables 90 and 
92 
1974 291.8 2,996.5 Estates recorded 15,000 UK IRS 1976, 
Tables 90 and 
92, NOTE UK 
from 1 January 
1974 GB 
figures 
284.735 and 
2934.6 
1975 310.5 3,441.8 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
15,000 UK IRS 1980, 
Tables 4.2 and 
4.4 
1976 288.6 3,910.4 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
15,000 UK IRS 1980, 
Tables 4.2 and 
4.4 
1977 268.2 3,866.6 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
25,000 UK IRS 1980, 
Tables 4.2 and 
4.4 
1978 285.3 4,823.6 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
25,000 UK IRS 1980, 
Tables 4.2 and 
4.4 
1979 293.5 5,921.3 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
25,000 UK IRS 1982, 
Tables 4.2 and 
4.3 
1980 294.8 6,883.6 Estates passing on 
death recorded; from 
this point the data refer 
to deaths occuring in 
the year 
50,000 UK IRS 1984, 
Table 4.6 
1981 295.2 7,628.0 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
50,000 UK IRS 1985, 
Table 4.6 
1982 288.2 8,210.8 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
55,000 UK IRS 1986, 
Table 4.6 
1983 296.9 9,195.3 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
60,000 UK IRS 1987, 
Table 6.6 
1984 273.8 10,371.6 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
64,000 UK IRS 1988, 
Table 9.6 
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Financial 
year 
starting 
Number 
of 
estates 
000 
net 
capital 
value 
£m 
Definition Thresh-
old £ 
Country Sources: AR 
denotes Annual 
report; IRS 
denotes Inland 
Revenue 
Statistics 
1985 245.1 11,481.7 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
67,000 UK IRS 1989, 
Table 9.6 
1986 270.9 12,783.4 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
71,000 UK IRS 1990, 
Table 9.6 
1987 234.7 14,306.4 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
90,000 UK IRS 1990, 
Table 10.6 
1988 249.2 17,320.1 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
110,000 UK IRS 1992, 
Table 10.6 
1989 276.4 20,121.9 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
118,000 UK IRS 1993, 
Table 12.6 
1990 252.4 18,580.7 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
128,000 UK IRS 1994, 
Table 12.5 
1991 255.2 19,453.2 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
140,000 UK IRS 1994, 
Table 12.5 
1992 254.5 19,511.2 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
150,000 UK IRS 1996, 
Table 12.5 
1993 285.1 22,196.3 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
150,000 UK IRS 1997, 
table 12.5 
1994 270.9 21,758.5 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
150,000 UK IRS 1998, 
Table 12.5 
1995 283.2   154,000 UK IRS 1998, 
Table 12.3 
1996 285.9 25,215.3 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
200,000 UK IRS 1999, T 
12.5 
1997 256.9 25,716.3 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
215,000 UK IRS 2000, T 
12.5 
1998 274.8 29,619.7 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
223,000 UK supplied by 
HMRC 
1999 283.8 34,603.6 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
231,000 UK supplied by 
HMRC 
2000 299.9  Estates passing on 
death recorded 
234,000 UK HMRC 
website, Table 
12.3 
2001 279.3 41,911.3 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
242,000 UK HMRC 
website, Table 
12.4 
2002 282.7 44,685.0 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
250,000 UK supplied by 
HMRC 
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Financial 
year 
starting 
Number 
of 
estates 
000 
net 
capital 
value 
£m 
Definition Thresh-
old £ 
Country Sources: AR 
denotes Annual 
report; IRS 
denotes Inland 
Revenue 
Statistics 
2003 285.7 49,998.0 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
255,000 UK supplied by 
HMRC 
2004 275.6  Estates passing on 
death recorded 
263,000 UK HMRC 
website, Table 
12.3 
2005 274.9 56,052.0 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
275,000 UK supplied by 
HMRC 
2006 274.7 59,444.0 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
285,000 UK supplied by 
HMRC 
2007 270.6 62,062.0 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
300,000 UK HMRC 
website, Table 
12.4 
2008 272.3 61,416.0 Estates passing on 
death recorded 
312,000 UK HMRC 
website, Table 
12.4 
 
 
Note: from 1980 the data refer to deaths occurring in the year; before 1980 they refer 
to deaths reported in the year. 
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Table 2: GB (UK from 1974) Estates as % national income with adjustments 
 Unadjusted 
estates £m 
as % 
national 
income 
Corrected 
for non-
filers as % 
national 
income 
Plus 
correction for 
exempt assets 
and 
undervaluatio
n as % 
national 
income 
Plus gifts inter 
vivos as % 
national 
income 
1896 204.2 14.8 15.2 18.1 18.9 
1897 235.7 16.5 16.9 20.2 21.0 
1898 237.7 15.7 16.1 19.3 20.1 
1899 280.0 17.6 18.0 21.5 22.3 
1900 250.4 15.3 15.7 18.8 19.5 
1901 276.3 17.1 17.6 21.0 21.8 
1902 259.4 15.9 16.3 19.5 20.3 
1903 251.2 15.7 16.1 19.2 20.0 
1904 252.9 15.9 16.4 19.5 20.3 
1905 260.9 15.7 16.1 19.2 20.0 
1906 286.0 16.2 16.6 19.9 20.7 
1907 269.0 14.5 14.9 17.8 18.5 
1908 258.5 14.6 15.1 18.0 18.7 
1909 271.7 15.1 15.6 18.6 19.4 
1910 258.0 13.8 14.2 17.0 17.6 
1911 265.9 13.6 14.0 16.7 17.4 
1912 266.7 13.0 13.4 16.0 16.6 
1913 281.7 13.2 13.7 16.3 17.0 
1914 292.6 13.6 14.0 16.7 17.4 
1915      
1916      
1917      
1918      
1919      
1920 372.9 7.3 7.7 8.5 8.8 
1921 402.0 9.5 9.9 10.8 11.3 
1922 431.2 11.6 12.1 13.3 13.9 
1923 441.9 12.5 13.0 14.3 14.9 
1924 461.1 12.5 13.1 14.3 14.9 
1925 456.4 11.5 12.0 13.2 13.8 
1926 466.5 12.4 13.0 14.2 14.9 
1927 511.1 12.8 13.4 14.6 15.3 
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 Unadjusted 
estates £m 
as % 
national 
income 
Corrected 
for non-
filers as % 
national 
income 
Plus 
correction for 
exempt assets 
and 
undervaluatio
n as % 
national 
income 
Plus gifts inter 
vivos as % 
national 
income 
1928 525.1 13.1 13.7 15.0 15.6 
1929 538.4 13.0 13.6 14.9 15.5 
1930 516.8 12.7 13.3 14.5 15.2 
1931 467.4 12.8 13.4 14.7 15.3 
1932 515.7 14.5 15.2 16.7 17.4 
1933 524.0 14.4 15.0 16.5 17.2 
1934 533.7 13.6 14.3 15.7 16.3 
1935 570.8 14.0 14.6 16.0 16.7 
1936 592.0 13.7 14.4 15.7 16.4 
1937 594.7 13.1 13.7 15.0 15.6 
1938 553.6 11.6 12.2 13.4 14.0 
1939 533.1 10.9 11.5 12.5 13.1 
1940 537.8 9.7 10.3 11.2 11.7 
1941 569.4 8.5 8.9 9.8 10.2 
1942      
1943      
1944      
1945      
1946 656.5 8.0 9.6 10.4 11.2 
1947 802.9 9.2 10.6 11.6 12.5 
1948 807.9 8.4 9.7 10.5 11.4 
1949 819.3 7.9 9.2 10.0 10.8 
1950 807.5 7.5 8.7 9.4 10.2 
1951 840.9 7.1 8.3 9.0 9.7 
1952 747.7 5.4 6.5 7.0 7.6 
1953 751.2 5.6 6.6 7.2 7.8 
1954 849.5 5.9 7.0 7.6 8.1 
1955 758.1 4.9 6.3 6.8 7.3 
1956 768.2 4.6 6.0 6.5 7.0 
1957 780.1 4.5 5.9 6.4 6.8 
1958 881.2 4.8 6.3 6.8 7.3 
1959 979.3 5.1 6.6 7.1 7.6 
1960 1,244.5 5.9 6.3 6.9 7.8 
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 Unadjusted 
estates £m 
as % 
national 
income 
Corrected 
for non-
filers as % 
national 
income 
Plus 
correction for 
exempt assets 
and 
undervaluatio
n as % 
national 
income 
Plus gifts inter 
vivos as % 
national 
income 
1961 1,346.9 6.0 6.5 7.1 8.0 
1962 1,429.7 6.1 6.6 7.2 8.1 
1963 1,530.6 6.1 6.7 7.3 8.2 
1964 1,531.1 5.7 6.0 6.6 7.4 
1965 1,591.1 5.4 5.8 6.3 7.2 
1966 1,661.1 5.4 5.8 6.3 7.2 
1967 1,739.0 5.4 5.8 6.4 7.2 
1968 1,923.2 5.6 6.0 6.6 7.4 
1969 1,948.2 5.3 5.6 6.1 6.9 
1970 1,967.8 4.9 5.2 5.7 6.4 
1971 2,275.0 5.1 5.3 6.1 6.9 
1972 2,743.5 5.4 5.8 6.6 7.4 
1973 3,126.9 5.2 5.5 6.3 7.1 
1974 2,996.5 4.5 4.8 5.5 6.2 
1975 3,441.8 4.1 4.4 5.1 5.7 
1976 3,910.4 4.0 4.3 5.0 5.6 
1977 3,866.6 3.4 3.8 4.3 4.8 
1978 4,823.6 3.7 4.0 4.6 5.2 
1979 5,921.3 4.0 4.3 4.9 5.5 
1980 6,883.6 4.0 4.2 4.9 5.3 
1981 7,628.0 4.0 4.3 5.0 5.4 
1982 8,210.8 4.0 4.1 4.8 5.2 
1983 9,195.3 4.0 4.2 4.8 5.2 
1984 10,371.6 4.2 4.7 5.3 5.8 
1985 11,481.7 4.3 4.8 5.4 5.9 
1986 12,783.4 4.4 5.0 5.7 6.2 
1987 14,306.4 4.5 5.0 5.8 6.2 
1988 17,320.1 4.9 5.4 6.1 6.6 
1989 20,121.9 5.2 5.5 6.4 6.9 
1990 18,580.7 4.4 4.8 5.6 6.0 
1991 19,453.2 4.5 4.9 5.6 6.1 
1992 19,511.2 4.3 4.7 5.4 5.8 
1993 22,196.3 4.6 5.0 5.7 6.2 
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 Unadjusted 
estates £m 
as % 
national 
income 
Corrected 
for non-
filers as % 
national 
income 
Plus 
correction for 
exempt assets 
and 
undervaluatio
n as % 
national 
income 
Plus gifts inter 
vivos as % 
national 
income 
1994 21,758.5 4.2 4.5 5.2 5.6 
1995      
1996 25,215.3 4.4 4.7 5.9 6.3 
1997 25,716.3 4.2 4.5 5.6 6.0 
1998 29,619.7 4.5 4.8 5.9 6.4 
1999 34,603.6 5.1 5.4 6.7 7.3 
2000      
2001 41,911.3 5.5 5.8 7.2 7.8 
2002 44,685.0 5.5 5.8 7.2 7.8 
2003 49,998.0 5.9 6.1 7.6 8.2 
2004      
2005 56,052.0 5.8 6.0 7.5 8.1 
2006 59,444.0 5.8 6.1 7.6 8.2 
2007 62,062.0 5.7 6.0 7.4 8.0 
2008 61,416.0 5.4 5.4 6.8 7.4 
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